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Local anti-anti-vaxxers in the news

Heather Bellow has a long feature in Friday’s Berkshire Eagle about residents pushing back against the spread of anti-vaccine disinformation in Columbia and Berkshire Counties, especially as it relates to COVID.

The article includes extensive quotes from Chatham’s Michael Richardson, publisher of a local newsletter called Vaxx Facts; Columbia County Community Health Action co-founder Michael Seserman, who now works at the American Cancer Society; as well as this site’s writing on the topic. The article also quotes some academic sources, and several vaccine skeptics.

Columbia Memorial Hospital and Albany Med announce ‘strategic alliance’

Hudson’s Columbia Memorial Hospital and Albany Medical Center are announcing plans today to form a long-term “strategic affiliation” or “alliance,” with the goal of “better coordination of care for residents of Columbia and Greene counties and greater operational efficiency for both organizations.”

A draft agreement, still in negotiation, is said to stipulate that some members of CMH’s board would serve on Albany Med’s board, and vice-versa. But hospital officials stress that the two institutions will remain distinct, saying that “there will be no acquisition or merger.” On its Facebook page, Columbia Memorial is even more adamant about that point:

This is NOT a merger. It is NOT a consolidation. It is NOT a sale, and it is NOT an acquisition or a takeover. We are working to align our respective organizations to take advantage of one another’s strengths.

Potential benefits of the new partnership for Columbia County patients could include providing easier and more immediate access to Albany Med doctors and resources. Columbia Memorial might also seek to tap into higher Medicare reimbursements obtained by a larger partner located in a metro region. (CMH has 192 beds, whereas Albany has 734.)

Seeking to reassure the public that CMH and Albany Med will remain indepedent, the hospitals state that they will maintain their own corporate identities, boards of trustees, fundraising efforts, management structures, executives, directors, supervisors, medical staff, staff leadership, bylaws, employees and employment policies, while each “determin[ing] their own salary and benefit structure.”

The plan, which apparently has been very quietly in the works for roughly a year, has not been officially adopted and would require State approval. A “mutual due diligence” process is expected to take several months before a formalizing any agreement.

The discussion of an alliance was not driven by financial strains, the hospitals say, noting that “Columbia Memorial is presently operating at a net positive margin.”

Rather, they note that “reforms associated with the Affordable Care Act” have pushed “dozens of provider organizations in New York State [to become] affiliated in the last few years alone... [V]irtually every other provider of every size and type is exploring potential linkages and affiliations with other providers due to these system-wide dynamics.”

The two hospitals’ joint press release can be read here, along with a question and answer sheet.

Explosive sodium found at TCI well before August inferno

Detail of a February 2012 report on an earlier fire at TCI, submitted five months before TCI’s calamitous, sodium-based explosions

Honoring the service of local firefighters ought to include taking every possible step to protect the lives that first responders put on the line every time they respond to a fire.

Unfortunately, in the case of the inferno last August at TCI of NY in Ghent, newly-uncovered evidence suggests that key officials may have ignored a direct warning which came well in advance of the company’s catastrophic August 2012 fire.

A report from February 2012 clearly demonstrates that the use of highly-explosive sodium metal at TCI (a processor of PCBs) was made known to multiple officials at least five months beforehand in a State Homeland Security report obtained by Patti Matheney of GhentCANN.

In the post-mortem discussions of the August disaster, it has been widely noted that scores of firefighters narrowly cheated death, withdrawing from the scene only moments before more than a dozen explosions rocked the Ghent night sky.

“We were only minutes away from bagpipes and flag-draped coffins,” Churchtown Fire Company 1st Lieutenant Nathan Chess wrote in a brave open letter to the community:

It is only based on sheer luck that a serious loss of life was avoided. It was only based on basic “off the cuff” comment by the company’s “keyholder” that the responding units were advised that there was a substantial amount of solid sodium stored in the plant. ... When exposed it creates an exothermic reaction and produces hydrogen gas (i.e.: Kaboom!).

Similarly, West Ghent Fire Chief Jim Cesternino praised TCI employee Tim Coons as a “guardian angel” and “hero” for rushing to alerting firefighters on the scene to the presence of sodium:

Coons was on scene and was able to provide us with information about some of the building contents. Providing that information to us saved firefighters lives.

However, neither luck nor guardian angels should have been needed that night, as the presence of sodium (and the danger it posed when doused with water) had already been reported to top County and West Ghent emergency managers earlier in the year. Nevertheless, documents show that water was sprayed into the building near this sodium, immediately touching off explosions.

Documents disclosed by The New York State Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Services now show that several key officials were alerted to the use of sodium metal by TCI subcontractor Power Station Subservices (PSS). Moreover, the explosion risk posed by sodium was described specifically.

On February 29th, 2012, Investigations Branch Deputy Chief Randi Shadic forwarded a report on TCI’s previous fire in several trailers outside the building in January. That earlier fire caused some $300,000 in damages and led to an extensive investigation of its cause. Page 7 of this widely-circulated February report said that in the wake of the January fire, 

TCI staff provided Material Safety Data Sheets ... to the fire investigation team. The MSDS Sheets are for the products routinely handled, stored, produced and disposed of by both TCI and PSS. One of the products used by PSS identified as “40% Sodium Dispersion in Transformer Oil” is identified as being capable of “spontaneous combustion in moist air”. The same product is identified as “reacting violently with water.”

Copies of this report were sent by Homeland Security to West Ghent’s Cesternino, Columbia County Fire Coordinator James VanDeusen (now retired), and New York State Police Investigator William Mulren working out of the Livingston barracks on Route 9.

Again, this warning came five months prior to the much more dangerous and disastrous one in August. 

Still, NYS Homeland Security’s interviews suggest that on the night of the second fire in August, the presence and danger posed by sodium at TCI came as news to leadership on the scene.

In an interview with investigators, Cesternino notes that Coons alerted him to the sodium sometime shortly after 10 pm at the scene of the fire -- and that he asked for “more information” about it, and asked for another company’s foam truck to be called in.

Nevertheless, the West Ghent chief’s interview and those of rank-and-file firefighters from the many companies responding indicates that teams were told to “drown” the fire via the roof.

This led, in the narrative of one Stockport firefighter, to an almost immediate reaction:

“Once we got a truck we used a deck gun and were spraying it through the overhead door at the rear. Initially we had the stream pointed to the right. I had them move it to the left or west and when we did the building started to rumble. It sounded like a hundred people pounding on the metal building and the fire really took off. Then we heard what sounded like a propane tank exploding. We had to pull back and hide behind the roll off dumpsters

Despite the “news” from Coons that sodium was in the building, and the request for a foam truck, Cesternino reports that

The plan was to surround and drownd [sic] the fire. Claverack was able to spray water through the top of the overhead door of the loading dock.... As soon as they started spraying water things started reacting inside the building. I was out front and a big blast of smoke came out the front. I could see what looked like camera flashes going off inside. The crews in the back were reporting explosions on the radio and saying they had to get out. I ordered an evacuation...

It is thus doubly perplexing and troubling to read that in spite of the warning from Homeland Security five months before, plus the warning from Coons just after the fire was discovered, firefighters were sent to douse parts of the building with water. It is of course possible that the sodium might have started exploding anyway, had any wet materials in the building come into contact with it as the fire progressed .

But the direct cause-and-effect described in these interviews—pops, reactions and explosions resulting from water sprays—leads to the hard conclusion that the risk may not have been adequately communicated to those putting their lives on the line for the community.

Also of note from these documents: The Columbia County Fire Coordinator’s office had requested Shadic’s unit’s assistance with determining the “origin and cause“ of the earlier January fire in part because it occurred “in the general vicinity of what had been a series of suspicious or incendiary fire[s],” Shadic stated in a January 27th email.

A tale of two fire companies

 

Before TCI moved to Ghent, it was known variously as Trans-Cycle Industries and TCI Incorporated. Documents from the early 1980s show the company was dogged by residents reporting fires at and emissions from its Newburgh location. The company initially tried to move to Athens (NY), but ran into a buzzsaw of community opposition.

The opposition of Athens’ first responders was particularly instrumental to TCI’s defeat there. The 1980s document above (found in a large archive of legal papers held by a Ghent resident’s attorneys) reveals what the firefighters of the Town and Village of Athens thought about the project. The Athens firefighters opposed it based on their assessment that  that:

• the “hazardous materials” handled by TCI “could pose health hazards during a fire”;


• fighting such a fire would require extensive “public infrastructure”;


• “a fire in this industry has implications for the public health”;


• “an inadequate response” to such a fire could have implications “beyond property damage”;


• these implications could include “the issue of toxic fumes... if a fire cannot be contained satisfactorily”;


• “water used to put out the fire” could be “contaminated” and “run into the ground.”

Abandoning the idea of moving from Newburgh to Athens, TCI set its sights on Ghent, securing permission in 1986-87 from the Town to build a structure on land owned by David Rivenburgh.

No similar objections appear to have been raised, except for the Town Planning Board chair briefly quizzing the company in a short letter about the potential presence of PCBs onsite. The same archive referenced above contains a 1988 letter from TCI of NY President David Laskin to a lawfirm in New York City, which purports to memorialize a visit to TCI by West Ghent fire chief Tom Rivenburg—a different spelling of the name, and no known relation to David:

Here, Laskin claims that Rivenburg said that “I don’t see any problem” with the facility’s arrangements. The letter also claims that “the fire department has been supplied with the same SPCC [Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure] Plan that has been supplied to the DEC and all pertinent Material Safety Data Sheets,” and that this had also been forwarded to the Columbia County Emergency Management office.

The letter further invited “the entire fire department” to tour TCI’s newly-built plant, which Laskins says has “an open-door policy to enable concerned citizens to view our operations.”

Today, multiple reports indicate that the remains of the TCI facility is under 24-hour armed guard while it is being demolished and, the public has been told, remediated of any pollutants. A stormwater plan for the site was recently agreed to by TCI and the NYS Department of Environmental Conservation, but not before almost a foot of rain has fallen on the site since the time of the catastrophic fire.

Death at TCI

Freon 113 molecule

Omitted so far from the media coverage of the TCI of NY inferno this month has been the most disturbing chapter in the company’s 26-year local history: namely, the 1989 death of 21-year-old Ghent resident Lawrence Smith, known as Roger.

Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) records contain this robotic description of Smith’s death:

“On February 28, 1989, Employee #1 entered an enclosed vessel 11 ft 6 in. long, 6 ft 4 in. wide, and 10 ft high. The container was open on the top. Employee #1 was cleaning the vessel with trichlorotrifluoroethane, Freon 113. He was in the vessel for approximately 15 minutes then left for approximately 15 to 30 minutes. Upon entering the vessel for a second time, Employee #1 became poisoned and collapsed. He had been in the vessel the second time for less than 5 minutes. The vessel had no mechanical ventilation.”

Smith collapsed and died of asphyxiation by freon gas, according to a Times-Union report at the time. A more detailed narrative of the tragedy and OSHA’s evaluation of TCI’s safety procedures can be read here.

Residents who knew Smith claim that a seal on his protective gear was broken. The horrific news hit his family especially hard, with his 46-year-old father also dying two weeks later, of a heart attack two weeks while driving to help fight a fire on Route 66. His teenaged sister also suffered a non-fatal car crash shortly after Smith’s death.

OSHA listed the event as a “fatality” from “poisoning (systemic).”

According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Freon 113 “is a colorless, nonflammable liquid” which “does not occur naturally,” and whose production was restricted starting in 1995. The agency states that “Freon 113 enters the body when breathed in with contaminated air or when consumed with contaminated food or water” and “it can also be absorbed through skin contact.”

EPA warns that “breathing large amounts of freon 113 for short periods of time adversely affects the human nervous system,” with effects ranging “from dizziness to incoordination and irregular heart beat.” The agency’s factsheet notes that “The largest users of freon 113 are companies that use the chemical to clean metal surfaces.”

A follow-up piece in the T-U reported that “unsafe conditions existed at [TCI] last February when a worker came in contact with a toxic solvent and died.” Catherine Clabby’s article stated:

“In a four-part citation issued against TCI Inc., the Occupational Safety and Health Administration faults the company generally for failing to provide conditions needed to keep workers safe while working with a hazardous material in a confined space. Specifically it faults the company's respiratory protection program, the means by which it chose respiratory equipment, the absence of a written description of how it educates workers about hazards and a failure to inform workers of the effects of contact with some materials.”

OSHA records indicate that the agency initially fined TCI $3,300 for workplace violations which led to the death. Company president David Laskin told the T-U: “We’re basically surprised about the alleged violations. We certaintly are going to take steps to defend ourselves.” While promising that TCI would “suspend” the use of Freon at its plant, Laskin speculated: “I don't know if it was the mask or a pre-existing condition or what.”

Either way, the company challenged the fines and they were reduced to $2,013. (Those who remember Roger Smith believe that the family eventually made a settlement with TCI was out of court, but this is unconfirmed.)

Remarkably, less than six months after this fatal incident, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) issued the company a go-ahead to conduct a 20-day test burn for a proposed PCB and electronic waste incinerator. The news fired up neighbors and local government, which blocked the plan in spite of DEC’s indulgence of the company. A DEC spokesperson said of the incinerator proposal at the time:

“We feel that at the levels prescribed by TCI, the burn plant poses no significant health risk.”

Today, officials at DEC and the New York State Department of Health are at the forefront of reassuring the public that the massive conflagration at TCI was safe, and no further testing for dioxins should be done.

Health official: No, we’re not re-evaluating

Image from CBS6 Albany video

At the Tuesday meeting of the Columbia County Board Supervisors’ Public Safety Committee, a top emergency management official stated that “Based on last week's meeting [in West Ghent] I believe the State is reevaluating that decision” not to do further testing for dioxins and furans.

However, that now appears to be off the table again—as far as the State goes.

Two separate residents of Ghent have each received a version of the following email from a NYS Department of Health official, in response to their questions about whether the State was indeed re-evaluating its decision:

From: Joseph P. Crua <[email protected]>
Cc: Keith Goertz <[email protected]>

Thank you for your inquiry regarding the TCI fire in the Town of Ghent, Columbia County.  As we stated previously, because all of the tests determined that PCBs and other contaminants are not present or present at low levels, no testing for dioxins or furans is necessary. Detectable levels of PCBs form the basis to determine the need to conduct additional tests for other potentially hazardous substances. Also, site information indicates the fire involved primarily containers of petroleum-based oil.  Most of the material that burned appears to have contained no or low levels of PCBs, as confirmed by the absence of detectable levels of PCBs in 32 soot wipe samples collected near the fire and in the surrounding community. Therefore, the formation of extensive or high levels of dioxins and furans is unlikely. Any dioxins and furans formed by this fire are likely to be at the levels that would be found in many kinds of fires and do not warrant additional testing.

Regards

Joseph Crua

Joseph P. Crua, MPH
Public Health Specialist IV
Chief, Metro Section
Bureau of Environmental Exposure Investigation
New York State Department of Health
547 River Street, Room 300
Troy, New York 12180-2216
Phone: (518) 402-7880

As noted here before, on the Thursday afternoon when the TCI inferno was only just dying down, officials stated that dioxin testing was expected back in “24 hours.”

Late on Friday, it was announced that those tests had not even begun—but would start on Monday... after an anticipated downpour. But on that Monday night, it was announced that the tests were called off and had been deemed unnecessary.

1986: Was Ghent misled about PCBs at TCI?

Click to enlarge 1986 TCI letter

Late ’80s paperwork obtained by this website raises questions about when and how TCI of NY became a processor of PCBs. Company letters, official Town of Ghent correspondence, and media reports dating from 1986-1989 indicate that either TCI’s plans changed, or Town officials were mistaken about the company’s real intentions.

On September 3rd, 1986, David Rivenburgh of Falls Road Industrial Park, Inc. applied for two building permits related to land his corporation was acquiring from William Wiegelt. Rivenburgh indicated that one of the buildings planned for the site would be bought by TCI Incorporated of Hudson. Accompanied by a $50 check, his application didn’t mention the use of PCBs, but alluded to handling “electronic transmission and distribution equipment.”

Plainly, this language set off alarm bells with Ghent Planning Board chairman John Winkler. He wrote back on September 15th asking Rivenburgh to produce a letter from TCI Inc. The letter, Winkler said, should explain among other things “what waste products are produced,” “how is waste matter disposed,” and whether the company deals with “any toxic materials, particularly PCB’s.”

Within four days, David Laskin of TCI Incorporated wrote to Winkler, affirming that:

“We will not accept any material that has been manufactured as Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) equipment.

Laskin then goes onto reassure the Town:

“Any oil-filled electrical equipment we will handle will be tested and drained prior to being received at our operation. The testing is to insure that there is no more than trace amounts (.05% maximum) of Plycholorianted Biphenyls that may have entered this equipment through servicing or repair through the years.” [emphases added]

Later correspondence and official comments suggests that either Laskin was not adequately clear in that last sentence, or the Town failed to grasp a nod-and-a-wink message buried within the letter’s technical language.

Laskin also wrote to the Planning Board chair that its “proposed building is large enough that we do not anticipate a need for any outside storage.” Photographs of the site, as well as published accounts, show that materials were stored outside the building. Indeed, some have suggested that the impact of the fire might have been worse had more transformers and other materials been stored inside instead of out.

 

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Indications that the Town of Ghent was starting to feel a bit bamboozled emerge from documents and news reports from 1988-89, when TCI applied to the State to add an incinerator to its Ghent facility. That incinerator plan was opposed by neighbors such as Marlene and Jerry Brody of Gallagher’s Stud, as well as by the Town. Legal wrangling dragged into the early ’90s, but the incinerator never came to pass.

The Brodys

The Town of Ghent’s legal correspondence firmly reiterates that TCI’s original application for a local use permit did not include the handling of “PCB equipment,” and that any other equipment would be drained “to insure there were no PCBs. On September 22nd, 1989, Town attorney Ted Guterman, (who is still serving in that capacity today) forwarded the Town’s Position Statement on the project to Planning Board chair Winkler:

 

“When TCI initially applied for a use permit in 1986... It was specifically indicated that the process would not include nor would TCI accept any material that has been manufactured as PCB equipment. It was further indicated that any oil filled electrical equipment would be tested and drained prior to being received at the premises in order to insure that there were no PCBs.”

Guterman’s understanding was echoed in a December 13th, 1989 article in the T-U, which quoted Brody attorney Jason Shaw as saying that “TCI was not forthcoming about the presence of PCBs when it applied three years ago to open its operation.” He added that “I don't think TCI was up-front about the fact that there would be toxic substances at the facility... They did not clarify the definition they used in an attempt to muddy the issue.”

In the same article, Guterman recalled “Laskin telling the Planning Board there would be no PCBs on the property.” Laskin countered that the Board “ knew we'd be handling the material and the amount would be miniscule... I can't remember how many hours we spent going over this.”

The Position Statement forwarded by Guterman also flagged the Town’s concern that TCI’s activities

“not result in any toxic waste generated or disposed of on the property or through the air, including PCBs. It should be noted that the Town of Ghent Zoning Ordinance contains a provision specifically prohibiting storage collection, retention or utilization of toxic waste or by-products or other similar toxic chemicals in any district.”

23 years later, the Town experienced what many residents now view as an uncontrolled incineration of materials which may never be authoritatively inventoried.

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Whoever one chooses to believe as to TCI’s original intent, clearly PCBs at some point began passing through the facility in both lower and higher concentrations than 50 parts per million.

For example, as reported previously at this site, a March 2012 TCI manifest shows roughly 2,000 pounds (901 kilos) of liquid PCBs with a concentration of 50-499 ppm (parts per million), along with 350 pounds of solid PCB debris, was shipped from TCI in Ghent to their sister company in Alabama. The Albany Times-Union for its part has obtained records “that showed some 50,000 pounds of PCB-containing materials and oils moving from the Ghent complex this year.”

It remains to be seen if, when and how TCI modified its original application materials to secure permission for such use—or if the Town let this unintended use slide. With TCI saying it plans to rebuild, and many residents calling for a full site plan review if it really does, it becomes all the more essential to determine what precisely the company has been permitted to do locally.

Cancer expert discusses health risks of burning PCBs

 

In the 15-minute video above, renowned cancer expert Dr. Mitchell L. Gaynor discusses the science and health risks associated with the burning of PCBs. 

Speaking at his Columbia County home, Dr. Gaynor first reviews the fundamentals of environmental carcinogenesis: how environmental exposures contribute to cancer. He then discusses how the uncontrolled incineration of PCBs leads to the formation of even more toxic dioxins and furans.

The former Medical Director at the Weill-Cornell Medical Center for Complementary and Integrative Medicine, Gaynor proceeds to explain why he has found the official reassurances and limited testing done to assess the risks of TCI of NY’s recent inferno in Ghent to be inadequate thus far.

The founder and president of Gaynor Integrative Oncology, Dr. Gaynor’s extensive resumé includes four books, and countless appearances in national media, from Good Morning America to Martha Stewart to Newsweek. He has also published numerous “studies on oncology and the effects of environmental toxins on health in peer review journals such as The American Journal of Clinical Oncology and The Proceedings of the American Society for Clinical Oncology.

He has been honored for his environmental advocacy by  the New York State Assembly—whose Committee on Environmental Conservation oversees the work of some of the officials responsible for the testing which is called into question in this video.

Firefighter speaks out about TCI

In the wake of August 1st’s inferno at TCI of NY, longtime Churchtown firefighter Nathan Chess has circulated the following email message, which is reproduced below by permission.

Chess writes that “it is with great trepidation that I push the send key with this message, but the mushrooming of this situation appears to be getting worse. And I care too much for my brother and sister responders to hold back any more.” He expresses his ongoing concerns about the health and safety of his fellow First Responders, noting that “We were only minutes away from bagpipes and flag-draped coffins.”

PCB testing is only part of the picture. What about tests for dioxins and furans—which on a toxicity level make PCBs look like lemonade?

From a cursory review of PCB incineration, the temperatures required are in the range 1000ºC with a extremely technical process to insure the complete breakdown of the PCBs without the subsequent creation of dioxins (a/k/a Agent Orange) and other highly toxic substances, I admit that my research is based on a quick skim of of highly technical information. But I am sure there are others within our community that are better educated on these procedures.

Additionally, as of this date it appears that no baseline testing have been done on the responders, command personal, EMS and other who where in close proximity to both the fire and plume for close to three hours. Thankfully, the majority of responders (including myself) were kept at what appears to be a safe distance from the incident. But as we have learned the hard way in such situations, distance does not ensure safety.

From my understanding this testing and comparison work would fall under the purview of the New York State Occupational Health Clinic Network, but I have seen no mention of any actions taken. No doubt it would also be their responsibility to have an ongoing procedure to monitor the workers currently involved in any remediation work.

And where is the Town of Ghent? [There’s] lots of praise for the bravery of the first responders, but sorry to be crude but action talks and we know what walks. It's good to see that one of the supervisors had the time to update his Facebook page with a posting that truly dealt with the ongoing situation—not!

And while I am on this point, it is only based on sheer luck that a serious loss of life was avoided. It was only based on basic “off the cuff” comment by the company’s “keyholder” that the responding units were advised that there was a substantial amount of solid sodium stored in the plant. This chemical is used as part of alternative treatment of low level PCB (< than 50ppm). But when exposed it creates an exothermic reaction and produces hydrogen gas (i.e.: Kaboom!)

We were only minutes away from bagpipes and flag-draped coffins.

I would also like to make perfectly clear that these comments and opinions are strictly my own and in no way represent my fire company or that any commanders, coordinators, supervisors and the many brave and dedicated responders, members, dispatchers, law enforcement, EMS and others who whose participation and selflessness make the Columbia County emergency services organization one of the best...

I have always taken great pride and satisfaction from my work with all of these individuals and organisations in the state and on par with any in the country.

But I feel it is my responsibility to express my beliefs, perceptions and and reactions to this event. Whatever the consequences, if it saves one life or prevents any injuries, it will be well worth it.  

NATHAN CHESS
1st Lieutenant
Churchtown Fire Company

 

Scientist: TCI tests “invalid,” untrustworthy

Dr. David Carpenter

In an unusually balanced and well-researched Register-Star article, the director of the University of Albany’s School of Public Health’s Institute for Health and Environment questions the validity of State tests which claim no pollution impacts from the towering TCI inferno on August 1st and 2nd.

Reporter John Mason (who cut his teeth on pollution issues while reporting on the St. Lawrence Cement proposal) cites UAlbany’s Dr. David Carpenter as saying that he “does not trust the results because they relied on Aroclor tests, which he said are not appropriate.” Dr. Carpenter, who also runs an independent PCB testing lab, states that

“I don’t trust (the DEC testing) at all... I would say it’s invalid. These analyses are cheap and relatively fast. The congener tests are expensive, but this is not going to tell you anything. I would recommend a much more detailed analysis of the soot.”

Mason’s article also gives the State plenty of opportunity to defend itself. This is the type of in-depth reporting which can really earn a local paper the trust of readers, and is all too rare in the Register’s pages. This site has heard through separate channels that the Register is in possession of one or more samples of debris collected at a neighboring property, and may be in the process of having it analyzed.

Dr. Carpenter’s assessment is particularly timely in light of tonight’s 6:30 meeting at the West Ghent Fire Company (near the entrance to the Commerce Park off Route 9H, about a half-mile south of Kozel’s, which unfortunately I cannot attend due to a prior obligation). The meeting was organized by State Assembly member Didi Barrett, who expects all or most of the involved officials and agencies to be in attendance.

Understanding the TCI test data

On Monday night, State and County officials released raw testing data related to the TCI fire in Ghent. No executive summary or other analysis was provided, except for broad assurances that the data was no cause for concern. Though a staffer at the State Department of Health stated that his agency was several days away from having such a document completed, officials went ahead with a call for an end to further testing.

Ghent resident Deborah Masters, who lives approximately 6 miles due east of the TCI fire site, has provided this site with an analysis of that technical data, after consulting with an engineering colleague. Masters ascertained that the limited testing was done by a company called Clean Harbors and processed by Adirondack Environmental Services in Albany. But when she spoke with a company rep (Tara Daniels) she would “only confirm their testing, and would not have any further conversation.”

In her opinion, using the PCB tests “as an excuse not to do further wipe tests on people’s properties is very strange,” yet typical of such agencies. “The very high levels of toxic fumes the residents may have breathed through their windows while sleeping,” she says, “were also never recorded.”

Masters writes that “the most troubling thing” about the situation “is not having air sampling from Thursday night or Friday day during the burn period of this fire. I suspect that there were samples taken, just not ones they are prepared to share with us.” She encourages residents to send Freedom of Information Law requests to the agencies responsible to attempt to secure that data.

Masters went on to discuss with her engineer the topic of

“why no VOC [Volatile Organic Compound] tests, which are more immediate tests, cheaper tests, and can’t be done once a hot fire is over, were never taken. Any mobile lab prepared for testing PCBs could easily test for VOCs.

“The other tests not taken, or at least not delivered to us, were tests for furans which result from burned plastics which the PCB byrms were made of (huge, heavy double-walled plastic bowls at the bottom of each PCB containment vessel—there would have been 4 or 5 of these within the facility), and for burning gas and oil which are both EPA-list carcinogens.

“The likely reason for very little soil residue is that very hot fires completely incinerate certain chemicals, which would include anything like toluene, turpentine, etc.

Regarding the presence of large amounts of mineral oil, Masters says that this “is used as a substitute in which to put PCBs after they are removed from the oil they used to be stored in.” She notes that only PCB sampling has been done, and that in at least one case the results ought to have led to more localized testing:

“They have tested for different kinds of PCBs, but the samples all read as ND (or non-detect), except for sample Aroclor 1260 which tested at 131 ppb (parts per billion), which is higher than the NYSDEC allowable limit of 100 ppb. This is one of the soil samples on the top left of the map. The over-the-limit level indicates that they should do grid sampling in that area to determine if there are oher high levels in that geographic area, but a wider area.

“They often use this kind of sampling to indicate that ‘there is no reason to do further sampling’ as all the samples, except one, are non-detect. However there are different soil and air samples from the map which have no indicated readings. These samples are listed on the map as AR, DT [and] DR. DT is listed in the legend as "dust track", and my engineer thinks the AR is at least an air sample, probably a troubling sample, as there is no information listed.

On a technical level, Masters explains for those trying to puzzle out these forms that the header “PCB TOTAL < 1.0 ug/100cm2” means less than 1 microgram per 100 centimeters squared. The notation “Surr.” means “surrogate,” indicating that the testing regimen used “a measured quantity of another chemical which acts as a control to verify the PCB sample methodology and specifies the percentage of recovery in the sample. So the sample of PCBs is spiked with the chemical surrogate, for accurate testing.” The abbreviation PQL means Practical Quanitation Limit, or the percentage range of recovery of materail from the sample.

Regarding the sampling of soil and surface water on the ground, Masters says that oils (found on a film on the water samples) were “collected by Westin Solutions on Thursday Aug 2nd and delivered to Accutest LabLink at 5:54 PM Saturday, Aug 4th. The wipe tests were collected on Friday Aug 3rd by Clean Harbors and analyzed by Adirondack Environmental Services between 12:20 am – 2:20 am Saturday Aug. 4.”

Masters says that her engineer agreed that citizens and officials should be on the lookout for the following:

• Whether fire responders in the 9 different fire companys were properly notified of what was onsite before being sent to fight an inferno there;


• Whether a sufficient Evacuation Plan was on file with the Office of Emergency Management, and whether citizen members were serving on that board;


• Whether NYS DEC conducted sufficient inspections of the facility;


• Whether TCI properly filed necessary reports to the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory database, and the RTK database; and


• Whether the community was properly notified of the potential catastrophe in progress.

 

Posted with Blogsy

DOH scientist: TCI “disappeared”

In a lengthy conversation today, Kenneth Bogdan, Ph.D of the New York State Department of Health’s Bureau of Toxic Substance Assessment discussed why the agency has concluded that further testing for dioxin and furan impacts from last week’s TCI fire would be pointless. 

Last night, the Columbia County Emergency Management Office released a statement that “The NYS Department of Health advises that as a result of these findings, additional testing in the surrounding community will not be necessary.” Since such testing had been promised by officials on both Thursday and Friday, the announcement came as more than a surprise. To many it felt as if the State were rushing to judgement, or at least denying residents the peace of mind they might achieve through more thorough testing.

Regarding several dozen pages of PCB testing data released to the public on Monday afternoon, Bogdan was asked whether the State has produced a summary or other analysis of that data which might allow citizens to better understand that highly-technical data. “We’re still working on that,” Bogdan said, saying that they hoped to complete such a summary “in the next couple of days.” 

Bogdan indicated that the State deemed the size and nature of what TCI had stored onsite several magnitudes smaller than other well-known emergency fires. As a point of comparison, he cited the notorious 1981 Binghamton State Office building fire, considered a major environmental disaster due to the spread of high concentrations of PCBs, dioxins, furans and other pollutants dispersed via the building’s ventilation system.

Asked whether the agency had a firm idea of what was stored, by contrast, at TCI’s facility in order to arrive at such conclusions, Bogdan indicated that they believed there was only one drum of PCBs onsite, but that most of the massive fire sprung from oils on-site. Considering that company manifests stopped appearing in the DEC’s database back in March, and that any records store on-site surely went up “into the cloud” in the building, Bogdan deferred questions to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) which has not returned a call from earlier today. Bogdan also urged residents to press TCI itself for answers, stating that “they just, like, disappeared for three days.”

A request was sent earlier today to TCI seeking an interview.

The bottom line for Bogdan was that after seeing the initial PCB readings, the agency felt that any similar testing for dioxins and other pollutants would not be likely to show elevated levels, either—both because of the wide potential dispersal area and their belief that any dioxin fallout would mirror that of the PCBs.

Asked whether it was possible that the PCB levels were low precisely because they had been changed into dioxins and furans by the intense fire, Bogdan initially said that it would be “unheard of ” for “100% of the PCBs” to be completely transformed. But he acknowledged that it was possible that enough of the PCBs were altered to lower those readings while also resulting to a concomitant release of dioxins.  Nevertheless, Bogdan stood by the agency’s position that further testing would be fruitless to undertake.

The agency’s phone number, if others want to discuss concerns with the DOH, is (518) 402-7800.